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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred When, Disregarding The Implied Consent Exception To The Warrant
Requirement, It Granted Pool’s Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
On January 12, 2016, Pool, suspected to be driving while impaired, caused a vehicular

accident and was transported to St. Alphonsus Hospital for medical treatment. (9/18/2017 Tr.,
p.5, L.19 – p.7, L.22; R., pp.15, 105.) At the hospital, the phlebotomist tasked with gathering
blood samples for medical purposes asked a police officer “if he should take [Pool’s] samples as
well.” (9/18/2017 Tr., p.13, Ls.8-22.) The officer said, “Yes, of course.” (9/18/2017 Tr., p.13,
L.13.) After receiving the blood sample, but before any analysis of the blood, the officer read
Pool his Administrative License Suspension advisory. (9/18/2017 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-23.) At no
time did Pool object to the blood draw.
A toxicology report from the blood sample confirmed the presence of several prescription
medications. (See 5/30/2017 Tr., p.46, Ls.18-22.) Pool filed a motion to suppress the toxicology
evidence, asserting that the warrantless blood draw violated his constitutional rights.

(R.,

pp.102-06). The state argued that the warrantless blood draw was supported by Pool’s implied
consent. (R., pp.123-25.) The district court, however, granted Pool’s suppression motion on the
ground that “there [was] no exigency at all and … a warrant could have readily been obtained for
a blood draw.” (R., pp.138-45).
The state appealed, arguing that statutorily implied consent is a different exception to the
warrant requirement than exigency and, under the implied consent exception, the blood draw was
valid. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-8.) In response, Pool “acknowledges that he did not provide
evidence that he withdrew his implied consent,” and recognizes that, because under Idaho
precedent implied consent remains valid until withdrawn, “the State’s assertion that the district
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court erred by requiring evidence of an exigency is well taken.” (Respondent’s brief, pp.1, 6.)
Pool, however, asks this Court to “reconsider its prior decisions” on implied consent. (Id.) He
has failed, however, to present any cogent reason why this precedent should be overturned.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts.

State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004).

“Constitutional issues are purely questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.”
State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 851, 275 P.3d 864, 866 (2012).

C.

Implied Consent Is A Valid Exception To The Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Requiring that a person submit to a
blood alcohol test is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).

Schmerber v.

“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process,

without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
Consent is a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Under Idaho law, consent may be
statutorily implied.

State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007),
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overruled on other grounds by State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575 (2014). Such
implied consent is provided for by Idaho Code § 18-8002, which reads:
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.
I.C. § 18-8002(1).
In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2014), a case specifically addressing application
of the exigency exception to the warrant requirement in DUI related traffic stops, the United
States Supreme Court broadly held that per se exceptions to the warrant requirement are invalid.
Following the McNeely decision, the Idaho Supreme Court revisited its implied consent
precedent. Citing then-existing Idaho case law that did not allow a driver to revoke his implied
consent, the Court determined that “Idaho ha[d] a per se exception to the warrant requirement”
contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in McNeely. Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423, 337 P.3d at 582.
The Idaho Supreme Court therefore overruled its prior decisions “to the extent that they applied
Idaho’s implied consent statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutionally allowed forced
warrantless blood draws.” Id.
The Court did not, however, rule that statutorily implied consent was invalid; rather, it
determined that implied consent was revocable.

Following the Wulff decision, the Idaho

Supreme Court explained that “[i]nherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the
right of the person to withdraw that consent.” State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d
368, 371 (2014). The Court reinforced that holding in a subsequent case, explaining that “a
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suspect can withdraw his or her statutorily implied consent to a test for the presence of alcohol.”
State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014).
Under Idaho case law, as now clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court, a driver’s implied
consent is valid so long as it is voluntary. For implied consent to be voluntary, drivers must (1)
give their initial consent voluntarily, and (2) continue to give voluntary consent. Wulff, 157
Idaho at 423, 337 P.3d at 582. “Drivers in Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary testing
by driving on Idaho roads voluntarily.” Id. (citing Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742). The
driver’s consent continues to be voluntary until he or she withdraws that consent by affirmatively
rejecting or resisting the evidentiary testing. Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646, 339 P.3d at 371. This
new framework for statutorily implied consent is now well-established in Idaho case law. See
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 422-23, 337 P.3d at 581-82; Halseth, 157 Idaho at 646, 339 P.3d at 371;
Arrotta, 157 Idaho at 774, 339 P.3d at 1178; State v. Eversole, 160 Idaho 239, 242-43, 371 P.3d
293, 296-97 (2016); State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 265-66, 371 P.3d 316, 319-20 (2016); State v.
Charlson, 160 Idaho 610, 613-18, 377 P.3d 1073, 1076-1081 (2016).
Pool recognizes the above precedent and acknowledges that, applying this precedent, the
district court erred when it granted his suppression motion. (Respondent’s brief, pp.6-7.) Pool,
however, invites this Court to overrule its precedent and hold instead that only affirmative
consent, and not revocable implied consent, can serve as an exception to the warrant
requirement. (Respondent’s brief, pp.6-15.) This Court should decline Pool’s invitation. Idaho
jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedents. The rule of stare decisis dictates that
controlling precedent be followed “unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time
to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles
of law and remedy continued injustice.” State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002).
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Pool cannot show that the Idaho Supreme Court has been manifestly wrong, unjust, or unwise in
its consistent holding that revocable implied consent is a valid exception to the warrant
requirement.
Pool’s primary argument is that under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, interpreted in light
of McNeely, supra, Idaho precedent upholding statutorily implied consent is manifestly wrong.
(Respondent’s brief, pp.6-15.) This argument was previously raised to and rejected by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Eversole, supra. The Idaho Supreme Court explained:
Eversole argues that “to the extent that this Court’s recent cases stand for the
proposition that implied consent is valid up to the point that a defendant refuses
testing, they are in conflict with the rule that it is the State’s burden to prove
consent, and that consent must be shown to be voluntary under the totality of the
circumstances.” Eversole contends that McNeely requires this Court to use a
totality of the circumstances test to analyze whether a warrantless blood test of a
drunk-driving suspect is reasonable and insists that Idaho’s implied consent
statute cannot alter the exceptions to the warrant requirement nor bypass the
totality of the circumstances test. We do not read McNeely so narrowly.
McNeely did not specifically address the validity of implied consent
statutes much less hold that implied consent statutes cannot serve as an exception
to the warrant requirement. Moreover, its emphasis on the totality of the
circumstances test was in regards to the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, not to implied consent statutes. Indeed, the Supreme Court
expressed disapproval of per se exceptions to the warrant requirement and held
that “the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream” did not present a
“per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases.”
McNeely, [569 U.S. at 145]. The Court held that instead, “exigency in this
context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. Nowhere does McNeely suggest that implied consent statutes
do not constitute constitutional consent or that a totality of the circumstances test
is the exclusive means for establishing consent.
Instead, McNeely recognized that implied consent statutes are one type of
“a broad range of legal tools to enforce [ ] drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC
evidence without undertaking warrantless nonconsensual blood draws.” [Id. at
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160-61] (emphasis added). The Court stated, “Such laws impose significant
consequences when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist’s
driver’s license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow the
motorist’s refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence against him in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.” Id. [at 161]. Thus, McNeely suggests that
implied consent statutes are still a valid means of obtaining BAC evidence.
Eversole, 160 Idaho at 243, 371 P.3d at 297.
Pool also attempts to bolster his argument that Wulff and its progeny were manifestly
wrong with a recent Arizona Supreme Court opinion, State v. Havatone, 389 P.3d 1251 (Ariz.
2017).

Pool’s reliance on Havatone appears misplaced.

That case “consider[ed] the

constitutionality of A.R.S. § 28-1321(C), the ‘unconscious clause,’ which allows law
enforcement officials to make or direct nonconsensual blood draws from unconscious DUI
suspects,” and held that it was unconstitutional. The specific statute reads:
A person who is dead, unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering the
person incapable of refusal is deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided
by subsection A of this section and the test or tests may be administered, subject
to § 4-244, paragraph 34 or § 28-1381, 28-1382 or 28-3183.
A.R.S. § 28-1321(C). Whether implied consent is valid where the alleged drunk driver is “dead,
unconscious or otherwise” and therefore unable to revoke his consent is not at issue in this case.
Because Pool was not dead or unconscious during the blood draw in this case, he could have
revoked his implied consent. He simply did not.
Though Havatone appears inapplicable, Pool cites to another out-of-state opinion,
Williams v. State, 771 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Ga. 2015) (also cited in Havatone), that appears more
relevant. In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court suggests that only actual consent can be
voluntary consent. See Williams, 771 S.E.2d at 377. Whether Williams remains good law,
however (even in Georgia), is questionable. That case relied heavily on prior Georgia precedent,
Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003), and a court of appeals opinion from Wisconsin,
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State v. Padley, 849 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. App. 2014). Cooper was subsequently overruled in
Olevik v. State, 806 S.E.2d 505, 520 (2017), where the Georgia Supreme Court (like Idaho years
before) recognized that implied consent could be revoked. Likewise, the Williams opinion’s
reliance on Padley for the proposition that implied consent was somehow constitutionally
insufficient was also significantly undermined by a subsequent decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, State v. Brar, 898 N.W.2d 499 (2017), which “clarified” the law, stating:
Prior cases from the court of appeals could be read as casting doubt on the
maxim that a person may consent through conduct or by implication. For
example, the court of appeals in Padley reasoned that consent that arises under
Wisconsin’s implied consent law is different from consent that is sufficient in and
of itself under the Fourth Amendment. [Padley, 849 N.W.2d at 876].
Specifically, the court reasoned that “actual consent to a blood draw is not
‘implied consent,’ but rather a possible result of requiring the driver to choose
whether to consent under the implied consent law.” Id. This reasoning implies a
distinction between implied consent and consent that is sufficient under the
Fourth Amendment. Such a distinction is incorrect as a matter of law.
Stated more fully, and contrary to the court of appeals’ reasoning in
Padley, consent can manifest itself in a number of ways, including through
conduct. Cf. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415-16 [ ] (2013);
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 [ ] (1978). The use of the word
“implied” in the idiom “implied consent” is merely descriptive of the way in
which an individual gives consent. It is no less sufficient consent than consent
given by other means.
Brar, 898 N.W.2d at 506.
Idaho precedent holds that revocable statutorily implied consent is a valid exception to
the warrant requirement. Pool has failed to show that this precedent is manifestly wrong, unjust,
or unwise. This Court should decline Pool’s invitation to overturn its precedent and instead
apply this well-settled precedent to the facts of this case. As acknowledged by Pool, application
of this precedent shows that the district court erred when it granted Pool’s motion to suppress
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evidence. The district court should therefore be reversed and this case remanded for further
proceedings.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order granting
Pool’s suppression motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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